Current U.S. nuclear waste storage strategy

Speaking of strategies to store nuclear waste, here's an article on the current de facto U.S. government strategy: compensate nuclear operators for storing onsite, and double the expense by continually pursuing doomed litigation to avoid these payments. I think in a perfect world we could probably figure out something better.

Larry Summers, prophet of toxic waste

Two decades after the infamous Summers memo,

The U.S. is reportedly in talks with Mongolia about the country setting up an international repository for nuclear waste.

Via FP Passport, details (fairly speculative) here.

Like a few other Summers statements, the one on toxic waste (which he later asserted was sarcastic) is easily demonized, but upon further examination shouldn't be dismissed out of hand.

I find the nuclear waste storage debate in the U.S. intensely frustrating - it is on par with entitlement spending in the political challenges of doing the right thing in the face of short-term incentives that are much stronger and more visible than the long-term ones.

I also liked an idea from Stuart Brand's Whole Earth Discipline: rather than try to prove a storage site will be safe for 10,000 years, use the Iroquois seven generations rule, find somewhere it will be safe for 200 years, and see how far re-processing technology has evolved by then.

Dan Rather on fracking gas

I just got around to watching a Dan Rather Reports piece on fracking, which aired a few months ago (now available on iTunes). It doesn't have any revolutionary new information, but is an interesting and serious journalistic piece on both the energy potential of shale gas and recent claims of groundwater pollution from fracking across the U.S. Features extended interviews with Chesapeake CEO Aubrey McClendon and a Wyoming farmer whose wife began suffering neurological problems after a gas well was drilled into the Bakken shale below their property. Recommended.

This also brought me back to Geoff Styles' post on shale gas and water safety, which has since generated a somewhat contentious body of comments. Geoff originally concludes that there isn't anything to worry about since fracking generally occurs at great depth and is isolated from surface water by thick layers of impermeable rock. Commenter Bartman then narrows down to two plausible pathways for surface water contamination - poor well casing/cementing and disposal of resurfaced frac water.

What doesn't look good to me is the industry's apparent attempts to obstruct further scientific testing of claimed contamination. Bartman's selection of plausible pathways sounds right to me, but I'm hard-pressed to think of a reasonable argument for not testing groundwater to see if fracking chemicals are in fact surfacing there. If they are, there is clearly a problem that requires further investigation. And if there is really nothing to hide, I wonder whether fighting against scientific inquiry and transparency is really the best PR strategy for shale gas interests in the long run.

CFC reduction: a success story

Also via Tim Haab at Environmental Economics:

CFC reductions are often hailed as an environmental policy success story. The reason CFC reduction policies have been so successful is Congress taxed the bejesus out of CFCs.

The Clean Air Act (Title VI) established caps on most CFC's as agreed upon under the Montreal Protocol, with a complete phase out occurring around the year 2000. The tax on CFC's was $1.37 a pound in 1990 and 1991, about twice the then current product price. Recycled CFC's were exempted from the tax.

The tax was raised in 1990 and again in 1992. The tax raised to $3.10 per pound in 1995 and to $4.90 per pound in 1996, raising the price six fold.

The lesson: economic incentives change behavior.

I find the subsequent news item about taxing overgrown lawns in Jupiter, Florida entertaining, but not very relevant. And unfortunately the "tax the bejesus" strategy isn't as viable for massive emittants (is that a word) like CO2, NOx and methane.