Finite room for construction in China

China's explosive demand will finally drop from its stratospheric level, either because China's economic development falters or because China is finally totally covered over in cement.

That is Rick Bookstaber, a deeply thoughtful blogger on financial markets, in response to Jeremy Grantham's newsletter on "the mother of all paradigm shifts" (i.e., "Days of Abundant Resources and Falling Prices Are Over Forever"), which excited the likes of Cowen and Krugman.

Like Rick I am in the less apocalyptic camp, although for much prosaic reasons (he believes that eventually our resource consumption will decrease as we increasingly lead virtual lives and turn away from material consumption). As Tyler Cowen says, China cannot continue to invest 50% of its GDP forever. There is a long way to go for the world to catch up to rich-world consumption levels, but it also won't happen all at once (apply an optimistic GDP growth rate to your favorite sub-Saharan African country and you'll be shocked at how long it will take to get where China's income is today, even if everything goes well). Resource demand may not be curbed any time soon, but ultimately I have more faith in the power of prices and markets to change behavior than the doomsayers seem to.

Fragiler-than-it-seems-Brazil, continued

I've worried before about whether Brazil's economic and political progress would falter if commodity prices swooned. Via MR, this FT article not only puts a number on that...

Plug in 2005 commodity prices, for example, and Brazil’s $23bn trade surplus would become a $20bn deficit.

... it also calls out another worrisome trend, the explosion of consumer leverage.

Bank credit is now growing at a 20 per cent annual clip.

That has given Brazil’s economy an appearance of strength, but also risked stretching it thin. Typically, Brazilians now spend a quarter of disposable income on debt payments. At the height of the US credit boom, by contrast, American households spent about 15 per cent.

With the real now at 1.57 vs. the dollar - higher than it ever got in 2008 - I am pondering whether now is the time to trim my Brazil investment exposure...

Commodity dependence of Brazil

The Globalizer, via MR:

When Lula won the presidency in 2002, Brazil’s main trading partners were the United States (25.5%), the Netherlands (5.3%), Germany (4.2%) and China (4.2%).

Over the eight years, the U.S. share collapsed, while the Chinese share more than tripled. By 2009, Brazil’s main trading partners were China (13.2%), the United States (9.6%), Argentina (7.8%) and the Netherlands (5.0%).

The writing was on the wall. As long as demand in these two nations continued for commodities, Brazil will continue to grow — but if demand were to fall abruptly, the situation could get difficult.

Brazil is currently a darling of economic and political progress, but lots (most? >100%?) of the underlying growth has been driven by commodity exports, and that story has ended badly before.

This article on Lula, also via MR, is also worth reading - it starts:

... in democratic conditions, to be more popular at the close than at the outset of a prolonged period in office is rare. Rarer still – indeed, virtually unheard of – is for such popularity to reflect, not appeasement or moderation, but a radicalisation in government. Today, there is only one ruler in the world who can claim this achievement, the former worker who in January stepped down as president of Brazil, enjoying the approval of 80 per cent of its citizens. By any criterion, Luiz Inácio da Silva is the most successful politician of his time.

Coinflation

I vaguely remember when pennies became worth less than the copper they contained; via MR, the same condition has spread to the nickel and beyond:

US five cent coins contain over 7 cents worth of raw material as of this afternoon, mostly copper and of course, nickel. If there is inflation, the prices of metal will increase, and the coin will have 8, 9, 10 cents worth of metal. Pre-1965 dimes contain over $2.42 of metal today, while pre-1965 quarters have over $6 worth of metal.

I wonder what they did to dimes and quarters after 1965, and whether the same is in store for the nickel. (While the penny, of course, should just be abolished.)

Commodity price passthrough, cotton edition

Here are some excerpts of alarmist journalism from the NYT:

A package of Oscar Mayer cold cuts. A pair of Nine West boots. A Whirlpool washing machine.

By the fall, people will most likely be paying more for each of them, as rising prices hit most consumer goods...

After trying to keep retail prices flat or even lower during the recession, Jones says prices for its brands will climb 15 to 20 percent by autumn.

... and here is Michael Roberts appropriately skewering that alarmist journalism.

Yesterday the near month futures price of cotton closed at $1.83/lb. That's pretty high, more than double the price of just a year ago. Before this year, I'm not sure [nominal] cotton prices ever exceeded $1.20...

How much do these high prices matter for the prices we pay for clothes?

Not so much. Consider that there is about 0.6 lbs. of cotton in a typical man's shirt. So that $1/lb increase in cotton prices over the past year means it costs an extra 60 cents to make the Brooks Brothers shirt for which I paid $40. On sale.

That should sound pretty familiar to regular readers who have seen the same trick with food prices.

Passing off 15-20% price increases as cost-driven when they are demonstrably not (at least for raw inputs) seems pretty risky and short-sighted. I can't speak much to the rest of the cost structure, although we are not exactly in a tight labor market in the U.S. either.

Can't fix commodity prices with monetary policy

Paul Krugman has the more detailed version with his traditional lefty spin, but I'll go with Michael Roberts' synthesis...

Commodity price rises have little to do with monetary and currency policies in the US and around the world.

... and concise takeaway:

We'd be wise to think about possible collateral damage of higher commodity prices, since I suspect high prices could be here to stay. But this really should have no bearing on monetary policy.

It's pretty easy to verify with a quick look at oil prices over the past three years - the dollar didn't fall far enough to push crude up to $145/bbl, nor rise enough to push it back down to $40, nor fall again enough to get back to today's range of $90+.

The opposite of speculation

A lot of people complain about speculation in agricultural commodities as the root of all sorts of evils. But what does it look like when there’s no speculation at all?

The pork belly is in danger of going belly-up... just six contracts changed hands in the month of November—fewer than uranium or palm oil. The once-bustling pork-belly pit has been moved to a corner of the CME's floor, an appendage to the lean-hog-trading pit.

There are several reasons, but a big one is that

Financial traders have largely shunned the contract because it requires buyers to take possession of massive quantities of meat.

It seems even small-scale market participants appreciate this dynamic:

"For a contract to be successful, you have to have fund participation" from hedge funds and commodity funds, said Dan Norcini, an independent livestock trader in Idaho who has been trading commodities for more than 20 years. "There're not enough volumes for them to move in and move out." Mr. Norcini stopped trading pork bellies about three years ago.

The moral of the story, as usual, is that “speculators” provide liquidity and liquidity is by and large a good thing.

Surging commodities ≠ inflation?

Paul Krugman doesn't think surging commodity prices will drive high inflation (and Michael Roberts agrees). I think they're probably right on balance, but I wish Krugman had plotted year-on-year commodity price and CPI changes on different axes in this graph:

Yes, the magnitude of year-on-year changes as drastically different, but eye-balling it, the directional correlation looks pretty high to me. Granted commodities are a small fraction of the our rich-world expenditures (not the case in poor countries where people spend 50+% of their income on food!); they are mostly wages and rent as Michael correctly points out. But it would also be worth looking back to before 1993, in particular the late 70s (a time of high commodity prices and high inflation), rather than acting as if 15 years of data from a single country proves the point beyond a shadow of a doubt.

Dollar driving commodity prices - for now

Via MR, James Hamilton at Econbrowser shows that the falling dollar - probably driven by quantitative easing - seems to be the main driver of commodity price increases over the last two months. The good news is that monetary policy seems to be working. The bad news is that I don't think we can expect this pure relationship to last for long - too many other drivers on the supply and demand sides are in play - so its value as a barometer for the Fed is probably short-lived.

Update: Dollar is driving metal and hydrocarbon prices, that is - agricultural commodities have more volatile supply.

Peak (or finite) helium

Via MR, are helium party-balloons the next commodity to spike? Apparently helium, which cannot be made synthetically or chemically, is subject to a serious market pricing distortion:

The US government established a national helium reserve in 1925, and today a billion cubic metres of the gas are stored in a facility near Amarillo, Texas. In 1996 Congress passed an act requiring that this strategic reserve, which represents half the Earth's helium stocks, be sold off by 2015. As a result, helium is far too cheap and is not treated as a precious resource.

Nobel prizewinner Robert Richardson thinks the government should

Get out of the business and let the free market prevail. The consequence will be a rise in prices. Unfortunately party balloons will be $100 each rather than $3 but we'll have to live with that. We will have to live with those prices eventually anyway.

I would love to understand the political reasons why this happened - the economic illogic is patently apparent, and I can't imagine it does much for national security either.

Price rises in non-speculatable food commodities

I recently had a contentious discussion over the extent to which financial speculation caused the food price run-up of 2008 (and prior years). I am skeptical that speculation was a major culprit, and I was unable to remember the specifics of the argument that prices rose similarly in commodities which are not index-traded. For future reference (my own as much as my readers'), I tracked it down in this paper recently released by the OECD. (emphases are mine)

If index fund buying drove commodity prices higher then markets without index fund investment should not have seen prices advance. Again, the observed facts are inconsistent with this notion. Irwin, Sanders, Merrin (2009) show that markets without index fund participation (fluid milk and rice futures) and commodities without futures markets (apples and edible beans) also showed price increases over the 2006-2008 period. Stoll and Whaley (2009) report that returns for Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) wheat, Kansas City Board of Trade (KCBOT) wheat, and Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGEX) wheat are all highly positively correlated over 2006-09, yet only CBOT wheat is used heavily by index investors. In a similar fashion, Commodity Exchange (COMEX) gold, COMEX silver, New York Mercantile (NYMEX) palladium, and NYMEX platinum futures prices are highly correlated over the same time period but only gold and silver are included in popular commodity indexes. Headey and Fan (2008) cite the rapid increases in the prices for non-financialized commodities such as rubber, onions, and iron ore as evidence that rapid price inflation occurred in commodities without futures markets. While certainly instructive, the limits of these kinds of comparisons also need to be kept in mind. Bubble proponents have pointed out that commodity markets selected for the development of futures contracts may be naturally more volatile than those commodities without futures markets.

The paper also includes more far more statistical including the latest Granger causality analysis, which is more rigorous, but also in my view less effective than anecdotes like the above in many informal discussions. Their overall conclusion is unequivocally in line with my view that

... at this time, the weight of evidence clearly suggests that increased index fund activity in 2006-08 did not cause a bubble in commodity futures prices.

In related reading, here are previous posts citing Thomas Malthus and Darrell Duffie on the benefits of speculation in food markets, and here is Scott Irwin (one of the OECD paper co-authors) last year on why index speculators didn't break the wheat market.

Speculation is not manipulation

In the fine tradition of Thomas Malthus, famous Stanford finance professor Darrell Duffie has penned an op ed entitled "In Defense of Financial Speculation: It is not the same thing as market manipulation." He has a sharp mind and makes the case well.

First, speculators perform valuable market functions by taking risk and disseminating information (remember Enron?).

Speculators earn a profit by absorbing risk that others don't want. Without speculators, investors would find it difficult to quickly hedge or sell their positions.

Speculators also provide us with information about the fundamental values of investments. When the fundamentals appear favorable, they buy. Otherwise, they sell. If their forecasts are correct, they profit. This causes prices to more accurately forecast an investment's value, spreading useful information. For example, the clearest evidence that Greece has a serious debt problem was the run-up of the price for buying CDS protection against the country's default.

Is this sort of speculation wrong? I have not heard why.

The distinction between "speculation" and "manipulation" is important.

Those who call for stamping out speculation may be confused between speculation and market manipulation. Manipulation occurs when investors "attack'' a financial market in order to profit by changing the value of an investment. Profitable speculation occurs when investors accurately forecast an investment's fundamental strength or weakness.

Manipulation is much harder to pull off than making a simple directional bet.

Market manipulation for profit is not easily done... Simply driving up the price, as speculators are alleged to have done in the oil market in 2008, is not enough. To make a profit, a manipulator needs to obtain monopolistic control of the supply. Given the size of the oil market, that seems implausible, absent a major and sustained conspiracy.

As long as speculators do not crash and destabilize financial markets with them, they are not where regulatory attention should lie.

It would be better for our economy to enforce anti-manipulation laws, and require that speculators have enough capital to cover their risks, than to attempt to squash speculation.

Worth keeping in mind the next time someone starts ranting about "reckless speculation."